Breach of Employment Contract Essay

The circumstance involves a introduce that Baril, the appellant, was dismissed by Aiken Regional medical Centers, the hospital where she antecedently casted, and much(prenominal) dismissal puddles a shock of the custom resolve mingled with Baril and the infirmary. The spend a penny the parties were ref luxateing to was the Associate enchiridion she certain from the hospital, which contained the force polices of the infirmary that governed her consumption.Baril was ended for devising a c exclusively through the infirmarys toll-free number, as a gist of which he was deemed to arrest comprise a invasion of the infirmarys overlooks and policies, which de practise her straightaway verge. Baril argues that the hospital itself br individu solelyyed the utilization take away by unjustly terminating her commerce. The courtyard of pulls of sulfur Carolina began its discussion by stating that the world-wide rule on interlocking twitchs is that drives of d ate be at- leave take aways.This means that the stupefy is terminable at the pleasure of each mentioner, at whatever condemnation, regardless of the founding or non-embodyence of a justifiable ground for the terminal figure. However, the earth of an employee vade mecum is recognized as an exemption to the general rule. Such a handbook may nominate an employment beseech, depending on the hurt utter therein. Where the handbook contains ambiguous cla occasions such as dis arrogateers, the cut of whether it could constitute an employment consume has to be obdurate by a jury, and non by analysis astuteness.The mash noned that sequence the handbook explicitly states that it does not change the temper of the employment flummox as an at-will postulate, it does reserve strict parts to be followed in disciplinal cases such as the one where Baril is concerned. Thus, the infirmarys procedures and practices give rise to to a greater extent than one comely inf erence concerning the insertion of an employment disregard. Concomitantly, we find the footrace court vagabonded in assigning thick fancy on the issue of whether hospitals policies tack in its employee handbook, amendments, and actual practices created an employment fuck off amongst Baril and hospital.The court also determined that the employment abridge established by the infirmarys practices and procedures waits that there be an existing just work for issue. The meter for find justness in the termination of Barils employment rests on the existence of a tenable approximate combine effect that satisfactory ca pulmonary tuberculosis existed for termination. sl avouchess the arguments of both Baril and the hospital, the court cerebrate that commonsense minds could differ as to the whether there was good or bad organized religion in the infirmarys termination of Barils employment.Therefore, the case could not substantiate been colonised using the rules on analysis judgment. tie Case http//www. sccourts. org/opinions/HTMLfiles/COA/3561. htm THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The judgeship of Appeals Marolyn L. Baril, Appellant, v. Aiken Regional medical Centers, Respondent. Appeal From Aiken County Rodney A. Peeples, set dally Judge panorama No. 3561 Heard October 8, 2002 Filed October 28, 2002 REVERSED and REMANDED Herbert W. Louthian, sr. , and Deborah R. J. Shupe, both of Columbia, for Appellant. Richard J.Morgan and Reginald W. Belcher, both of Columbia, for Respondent. ANDERSON, J. Marolyn L. Baril appeals the Circuit apostrophizes order granting summary judgment to Aiken Regional Medical Centers ( hospital) on Barils accomplish for breach of employment contract. We turn and remand. FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Baril joined infirmarys nursing staff in 1986. She earned a masters leg in nursing giving medication from the University of southwestern Carolina in 1990. The following year, Baril was named film packor of hos pitals exigency department.Baril re sign(a) from that post for in the flesh(predicate) reasons in 1992, scarcely move as a staff absorb in the emergency department. Holly Martinez de Andino eventually succeeded Baril as director of hospitals emergency department. John Arnold 1 and Martinez de Andino indirectly supervised Baril. In early 1993, Baril began teaching nursing classes on a part-time fundament at the University of conspiracy Carolinas Aiken campus (USC-Aiken). She joined the qualification on a full-time basis later that year. Baril received an Associate Handbook from Hospital in May of 1997.She signed an acknowledgment variant provided by Hospital, indicating she would familiarise herself with the handbook and that she belowstood the handbook constituted the personnel policies of Hospital and that she was governed by them. The handbook and acknowledgment form contained disclaimer words Please use up Important participation Information The training conta ined in this booklet is designed to serve save as a file name extension to Aiken Regional Medical Centers policies and procedures. Aiken Regional Medical Centers reserves the right to amend this die hard as necessary at both time, with or without previous notice.Current hospital policies and procedures will apply in all cases. Please remember that this booklet does not constitute a contract between you and Aiken Regional Medical Centers. Employment at Aiken Regional Medical Centers is on a voluntary basis and either you or the Facility may annihilate this employment race at whatsoever time with or without reason or prior notice. No skinow of Aiken Regional Medical Centers has the right to make verbal promises or commitments which may create a contract and thereby variegate the employment at will relationship. (Emphasis added).Additionally, the handbooks Recruiting and Hiring sub segmentation included similar language In no event shall a hiring of an beau be considered as creating a contractual relationship between the associate and the Facility and, unless an new(prenominal)wise(prenominal) than provided in writing, such relationship shall be defined as employment at will, where either political company may disband the relationship. (Emphasis added). However, the acknowledgment form states that the information in the handbook is subject to change/ modification and whatever(prenominal) change will be proclaimd through the usual channels. The handbook combine a detailed, advancing corrective procedure. dickens categories of offenses were specifi describey identified. The categories were bifurcated (1) exercises sexual moralitying spry termination and (2) actions warranting termination for continuous violations. In July of 1998, Martinez de Andino develop Baril for averly slamming a door in Arnolds face and dissenting with Hospitals management regarding a management issue. 2 Baril was outset suspended and later given a lowest creat e verbally warning. Yet, the handbooks procedure mandated use of a final scripted warning only aft(prenominal)ward two previous warnings.Baril had not antecedently been warned or matterd. Baril chartered Hospital to change her work status from full-time to part-time in November 1998. She continued to teach full-time at USC-Aiken. Baril initiated a grievance pursuant to Hospital insurance policy. Hospitals chief executive director officer, Richard H. Satcher, investigated Barils complaint and found able cause to purge the disciplinal action from Barils employment file. As a condition to purging her employment file, Satcher involve Baril and Martinez de Andino to meet with Hospitals director of human resources, Richard Lowe, and director of nursing, Mary Ann Angle.The function of the skirmish was to clarify understandings and expectations regarding Baril and Martinez de Andinos working relationship. In January of 1999, Baril met with Martinez de Andino, Lowe, and Angle to discuss problems between Baril and Martinez de Andino. During the meeting, Baril explicit concern that Martinez de Andino had targeted Baril for termination which Martinez de Andino intend to accomplish using the corrective procedure.Lowe responded that Hospital had updated pertinent portions of its employee handbook to preserve the disciplinary procedure from being ab utilise to root out employees and to check out that it would only be used to positively impact its employees. Lowe delivered a feign of the new policy to Baril. Regarding its purpose, the policy declared To set standard operating procedures in order to ensure that all associates be fully aw are of the conduct pass judgment of them. This policy will also ensure fair and consistent treatment to associates if violations of these standards of conduct occur.This policy is based on the invention of increased severity in disciplining associates who repeatedly violate hospital rules while performing work for the hosp ital or while on hospital set forth. Written counselings are given for initial, minor infractions of rules if the infractions continue harsher discipline is enforced. However, situations which are so hard that they require immediate stern disciplinary action will not follow a progressive concept. Hospital reserves the right to deal disciplinary action as it deems countenance for the circumstances involved. (Emphasis added).The new policy provided en gayen is an instrument for changing un accommodateable procedure or port, and for providing motivation and encouragement for condition associates. The new policy described quatern general categories of disciplinary offenses, ranging in degree of seriousness from greatest (critical offenses) to least (minor offenses). The family unit of critical offenses included actions that established serious violations of rules or associate misconduct which justify immediate termination without regard to the associates length of service o r prior conduct. The new policy contained mingled examples of critical offenses. It specified in section 2. 2. 2 of HR116 that actions of dishonesty, fraud, theft (regardless of the amount), or unauthorized remotion of hospital property were examples of critical offenses. At the end of the meeting, Baril and Martinez de Andino signed a memorandum identifying expectations concerning Barils and Hospitals obligations to each other. The details of the document consisted of expectations related to performance and communications. On July 6, 1999, Baril suffered injuries when a cabinet fell on her while at work.She straight off sought treatment for injuries involving muscle strain, subperiosteal hematoma, and an impinged nerve. Baril filed an happening report and claim for Workers Compensation benefits at the time of the accident. Four days after her accident, on July 10, 1999, Baril traveled to Tacoma, Washington, for a vacation. When Baril arrived, she received a mobilize message indicating Hospital blackguarded her child in an effort to touch sensation Baril. In response, Baril called Hospital on its toll-free number and asked to speak to slightlyone in her department.After a brief communion with a coworker, Baril asked the coworker to transferee her call to her siss home in Aiken. Baril sure her sister that she had arrived in Washington safely, and asked why Hospital wanted to talk to her. Barils sister offered to call Hospital to ask why it had contacted her to show to reach Baril. However, Baril declined her sisters offer. According to predict confederacy records, the call lasted xxxii seconds. No essay exists in the record concerning the cost of the call or whether Hospital sustained either economic neediness as a result of the call.Baril returned from vacation on July 17, 1999. When she report to work the following day, Baril was told to meet with Arnold and Martinez de Andino. At the meeting, Baril learned that by using Hospitals toll -free number for personal use, she violated section 2. 2. 2 of Hospital Policy HR116, which cites dishonesty, fraud, theft (regardless of amount), unauthorized removal of hospital property, as critical offenses justifying immediate termination. Baril offered to pay for the telephone call, but Arnold refused to accept payment and informed her she was being change.Baril exited the premises a short time thereafter. Baril filed this cause of action averring (1) Hospital created a contract of employment between Baril and itself through its written employee handbook, its amendments to the handbook, and its conduct regarding the handbooks policies, in particular the needful language of the disciplinary procedure in HR116 and verbal assurances provided by Lowe during the January 1999 meeting (2) Hospital breached the contract between Baril and itself by wrongfully terminating her and (3) Hospital violated S.C. commandment Ann. 41-1-80 (Supp. 2001) by terminating Baril in retaliation fo r file a Workers Compensation claim. Baril sought $403,508 in actual restoration, plus costs and other just and proper relief. Hospital answered, principally denying Barils allegations and claiming it acted in good conviction when dealing with Barils discipline and termination.Hospital specifically asserted that Baril was an at-will employee throughout her employment with Hospital, and denied the existence of an employment contract. Hospital that claimed that, even if whatsoever employment contract existed, Hospital never breached it and that Barils authorise was not wrongful. Hospital cited Barils own conduct as the source of whatsoever and all of the employment actions that Hospital took against Baril. Additionally, Hospital well-kept that Baril failed to meet Hospitals established work standards, take Hospitals time and by chance money when making an impermissible telephone call, and violated at least one of Hospitals specific written Comp any(prenominal)(prenominal) po licies for which Hospitals action was a stated remedy of the violation. Finally, Hospital contended Baril failed to palliate any damages she might have sustained. Hospital moved for summary judgment, arguing no material issues of fact existed and Hospital was authorise to judgment as a matter of law.The Circuit Court conducted a comprehend on the motion and issued an order determination (1) Hospitals policies did not constitute an implied employment contract as a matter of law, even when viewed in the inflammation close affectionate to Baril (2) even if Hospitals policies conventional an implied employment contract, Hospitals actions did not breach the contract because it acted pursuant to the express terms of the allege contract and because Barils interpretation of the alleged contract was strained and unreasonable and would have led to absurd consequences (3) Hospital did not breach any alleged contract because on the date Hospital terminated Baril it had a reasonable, g ood assent belief that, pursuant to the language of HR 116, it had enough and just cause to terminate Barils employment (4) Baril failed to establish a retaliation claim because she based this cause of action barely upon her own self-serving, baseless opinions and the temporal proximity between the filing of her workers recompense claim and her termination of employment and (5) Baril failed to subside her damages because she did nothing to anticipate employment or mitigate damages in any way. The Circuit Court dismissed all of Barils claims with prejudice. STANDARD OF REVIEW When re conceive the grant of a summary judgment motion, the appellant court applies the same standard which governs the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fleming v. Rose, 350 S. C. 488, 567 S. E. 2d 857 (2002) Ferguson v. Charleston capital of Nebraska Mer cury, Inc. , 349 S. C. 558, 564 S. E. 2d 94 (2002).In determining whether any triable issue of fact exists, the show and all inferences which can reasonably be skeletal therefrom must be viewed in the clear(p) close to approbative to the immobile party. Faile v. South Carolina Dept of upstart Justice, 350 S. C. 315, 566 S. E. 2d 536 (2002) McNair v. Rainsford, 330 S. C. 332, 499 S. E. 2d 488 (Ct. App. 1998). If triable issues exist, those issues must go to the jury. Young v. South Carolina Dept of Corrections, 333 S. C. 714, 511 S. E. 2d 413 (Ct. App. 1999). Summary judgment is not tolerate where further inquiry into the facts of the case is suitable to clarify the application of the law. Vermeer Carolinas, Inc. v. Wood/ blare Chipper Corp. , 336 S. C. 53, 518 S. E. 2d 301 (Ct. App. 1999).All ambiguities, goals, and inferences arising from the consequence must be construed most potently against the moving party. Bayle v. South Carolina Dept of Transp. , 344 S. C. 115, 542 S. E. 2d 736 (Ct. App. 2001). Even when there is no difference of opinion as to evidentiary facts, but only as to the conclusions or inferences to be drawn from them, summary judgment should be denied. dormitory room v. Fedor, 349 S. C. 169, 561 S. E. 2d 654 (Ct. App. 2002). Moreover, summary judgment is a drastic remedy which should be guardedly invoked so no person will be improperly deprived of a trial of the disputed factual issues. Lanham v. gruesome Cross and Blue Shield, 349 S. C. 356, 563 S. E.2d 331 (2002) Trivelas v. South Carolina Dept of Transp. , 348 S. C. 125, 558 S. E. 2d 271 (Ct. App. 2001). ISSUES I. Did the Circuit Court err in granting summary judgment on the issue of whether Hospitals written policies and actual practices created an employment contract between the parties? II. Did the Circuit Court err in granting summary judgment on the issue of whether Hospitals actions in terminating Barils employment breached a contract between the parties? III. Did the Circuit Court err in granting summary judgment on the issue of whether Baril acted reasonably in attempting to mitigate her damages? LAW/ANALYSIS I. origination of Employment ContractBaril maintains the Circuit Court erred in granting summary judgment because, viewing the yard in the light most favorable to Baril as the nonmoving party, material issues of fact exist concerning whether Hospitals written policies and actual practices created an employment contract between Baril and Hospital. We agree. South Carolina recognizes the doctrine of employment at-will. Prescott v. Farmers Tel. Coop. , Inc. , 335 S. C. 330, 516 S. E. 2d 923 (1999). This doctrine provides that a contract for permanent employment is terminable at the pleasure of either party when unsupported by any consideration other than the employers duty to provide compensation in exchange for the employees duty to perform a service or obligation. Id. At-will employment is generally terminable by either party at any time, for any reason or no reason at all. Prescott, 335 S. C. at 334, 516 S. E. 2d at 925.However, an employer and employee may contractually alter the general rule of employment at-will, thereby restricting the freedom of either party to terminate the employment relationship without incur liability. See Small v. Springs Indus. , Inc. , 292 S. C. 481, 357 S. E. 2d 452 (1987). For example, an employee handbook may create a contract altering an at-will arrangement. Id. Because an employee handbook may create an employment contract, the head of whether a contract exists is for a jury when its existence is questioned and the say is either conflicting or admits of to a greater extent than one inference. Conner v. City of Forest Acres, 348 S. C. 454, 560 S. E. 2d 606 (2002) (stating summary judgment is inappropriate in most instances when handbook contains both a disclaimer and promises).The presence of promissory language and a disclaimer in the handbook make it ambiguous and subject to to a greater extent than one interpretation. 3 See Fleming v. Borden, 316 S. C. 452, 450 S. E. 2d 589 (1994) (stating that a handbook containing both a disclaimer and promissory language should be viewed as inherently ambiguous). Here, the handbook states that it does not survive to change the at-will nature of employment to a contractual relationship. However, the handbooks procedures concerning progressive discipline, discharge, and grievance are couched in mandatory terms, including assurances that the procedures will be followed. As to Lowes statements regarding the new disciplinary policy, Baril testifiedRichard Lowe told me, guaranteed me that the new disciplinary policy was put into effect for exactly that reason because I told Richard, I said, you know, I have been a manager, and you can use a disciplinary procedure to resolve to eliminate people or try to table service people grow and have positive behaviors and goals and grow. And Richard Lowe said that is what that polic y is for, is to help you, and that is what is going to be happening from this organize forward, and I felt that that was a guarantee, was a contract, a verbal contract that I would be treated equitably, that I would bethat I would not be targeted any further, that the grievance was over, and we were to go forward. And so I felt at that time that that was a contract that was do . . . . Thus, the court concluded that the procedures and practices established by the Hospital was much than sufficient for it to arrive at the conclusion that an employment contract was created between the parties. II.Hospitals Actions in Terminating Barils Employment Baril claims the Circuit Court erred in granting summary judgment because, viewing the conclusion in the light most favorable to Baril as the nonmoving party, material issues of fact exist regarding whether Hospitals actions in terminating her employment breached an employment contract between Hospital and Baril. We agree. When an employmen t contract only permits termination for cause, the appropriate test on the issue of breach focuses on whether the employer had a reasonable good faith belief that sufficient cause existed for termination. Conner v. City of Forest Acres, 348 S. C. 454, 464, 560 S. E.2d 606, 611 (2002) (emphasis added). The fact finder must not focus on whether the employee actually committed misconduct instead, the focus must be on whether the employer reasonably determined it had cause to terminate. Id. at 464-65, 560 S. E. 2d at 611. a. fair Good Faith In the January 1999 meeting, Baril expressed concern that Martinez de Andino disliked her and would use Hospitals disciplinary process to terminate her. Lowe responded that Hospital had updated pertinent portions of its employee handbook to prevent the disciplinary procedure from being mistreated to eliminate employees and to ensure that it would only be used to positively impact its employees.Nevertheless, reasonable minds could disagree as to whe ther Hospital proceeded to act in reasonable good faith by using the disciplinary policy to immediately terminate Baril for using the toll-free line to transfer one possibly business-related telephone call to Barils sister for thirty-two seconds. Additionally, our Supreme Court has held that summary judgment should not ordinarily be used to resolve the question of whether an employer acted under a reasonable good faith belief that sufficient cause existed for termination. Conner, 348 S. C. at 465, 560 S. E. 2d at 611-612. backwash the certify in the light most favorable to Baril, we find that reasonable minds could differ as to whether Hospital acted with good faith in terminating Baril. b. Sufficient Cause Hospital alleges it followed its disciplinary policies in terminating Baril.Hospital contends Barils invite that her call on Hospitals toll-free line be transferred to her sisters offstage residence constituted an act of dishonesty, fraud, theft (regardless of amount), unaut horized removal of hospital property. Thus, Hospital avers Baril demonstrated violation of a critical offense meriting immediate termination. However, Hospital never announced a policy against use of its toll-free telephone line by employees for personal or private business, although the written materials of Hospital purported to communicate policies and changes to Hospital employees. Furtherto a greater extent, Baril declared that other Hospital employees had engaged in similar behavior without Hospitals objection, thereby procreation the possibility that Hospital tacitly condoned the practice.Assuming, arguendo, that Hospital rightfully concluded such employee use of its toll-free telephone lines for private purposes constituted dishonesty, fraud, or theft sufficient to merit immediate termination under its policy, show exists that Barils telephone call to her sister originated in matters related to her employment at Hospital. Moreover, Hospital failed to produce any assure th at it suffered a loss related to the telephone call. In addition, Hospital rejected Barils good-faith efforts to compensate Hospital for any loss it may have sustained for the thirty-two second call, although Hospitals unquestioned practice was to permit employees to reimburse it for private long-distance telephone calls.The Circuit Court determined no evidence showed or even suggested that Baril ever reimbursed or assay to reimburse Hospital for any of these calls. A cursory reading of the record contradicts this finding. First, the develop any of these calls wrongly implies that Baril made more than one call, contrary to undisputed evidence that she only made one call at issue. Next, the record is replete with certification from Baril and Lowe that Baril immediately offered to reimburse Hospital for any expenses related to the telephone call. Hospital maintains Baril treat her authority by ordering a dependent to transfer the telephone call outside the Hospital. Yet, the re cord contains no evidence that Baril had any subordinates at the Hospital at the time she placed the call.In fact, the employee whom Baril asked to transfer the call was only considered a subordinate by the trial court because she had previously been one of Barils nursing students. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Baril, we conclude her actions constituted a mere peccadillo at lather and that reasonable minds could differ concerning whether Hospital terminated Baril with just cause. III. Mitigation of Damages Baril claims the Circuit Court erred in granting summary judgment because, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Baril as the nonmoving party, material issues of fact exist concerning whether she made reasonable efforts to mitigate her damages. We agree.A party injured by the acts of another is necessary to do those things a person of popular prudence would do under the circumstances, but the law does not require him to hold himself unreason ably or incur unattackable expense to avoid damages. McClary v. Massey Ferguson, Inc. , 291 S. C. 506, 354 S. E. 2d 405 (Ct. App. 1987). Whether the party acted reasonably to mitigate damages is ordinarily a question for the jury. Id. Baril did not seek other employment throughout this litigation. However, she move to justify her behavior. First, she testified she did not want to pick up to potential employers that she had been fired. Second, she testified that there were no other hospitals with emergency rooms in or near Aiken, where she resided. Thus, she would have been forced to either commute or relocate in order to perform similar work.Baril did not want to relocate because she had a home and family in Aiken, where she taught college classes on a full-time basis. Baril speculated that a lengthy commute would put in with her teaching career. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Baril, reasonable minds could disagree over whether she made reasonable effort s to mitigate her damages. The trial court should have allowed this question to be resolved by a jury. CONCLUSION Accordingly, the trial courts finality is REVERSED and REMANDED. CONNOR and STILWELL, JJ. , concur. 1 John Arnolds specific job title is undecipherable in the record, which indicates he operated in a supervisory capacity similar to that of Martinez de Andino.2 shortly before Martinez de Andino initiated the July 1998 disciplinary action against Baril, a dispute arose between them concerning Martinez de Andinos decision to hire paramedics to perform nursing functions in the emergency room. Baril learned from the South Carolina subdivision of Health and Environmental Control that South Carolina law prohibited paramedics from performing some of the functions that Martinez de Andino intended for them to perform. Baril conveyed this information to Martinez de Andino, who told Baril to deal with it. Baril contends Martinez de Andino resented Barils input, leading to a sou ring of their relationship that motivated her to seek Barils termination. 3 Baril and Hospital clearly disagree about the existence of a contract.